In this paper, I argue that the certainty about the wrongness of killing must not be considered as a universal, but as a local one. Initially, I show that there exist communities in which the wrongness of killing innocents is not a moral certainty and that this kind of case cannot be justified by arguing that such people are psychopaths. Lastly, I argue that universal certainties do not admit of exceptions: thus, the fact that some exceptional cases affect the certainty (...) that killing innocents is wrong, leads me to conclude that it is a local certainty. (shrink)

Literature on indoctrination has focused on imparting and revising beliefs, but it has hardly considered the way of teaching and acquiring certainties—in Wittgenstein’s sense. Therefore, the role played by rationality in the acquisition of our linguistic practices has been overestimated. Furthermore, analyses of the relationship between certainty and indoctrination contain major errors. In this paper, the clarification of the aforementioned issues leads me to suggest the avoidance of the term ‘indoctrination’ so as to avoid focusing on the suitability of the (...) case to the concept rather than on the analysis of the case itself. This should facilitate that the process of helping children to acquire a world-picture—by teaching them to ignore alternatives to certainties—is definitely accepted as normal and natural, for many beliefs are expected to end up becoming ungrounded certainties not only in the medium or long term, but also, and above all, in the short term. (shrink)

After describing Wittgenstein's notion of ‘certainty’, in this article I provide four arguments to demonstrate that no certainty can be acquired at will. Specifically, I argue that, in order to assimilate a certainty, it is irrelevant whether the individual concerned has found a ground that seemingly justifies that certainty; has a given mental state; is willing to accept the certainty on the proposal of a persuader; or tries to act according to the certainty involved. Lastly, I analyse how each of (...) these arguments is reflected in the way children acquire certainties. (shrink)

It is expected that children increasingly learn to identify errors throughout their schooling process and even before it. As a further step, however, some scholars have suggested how a culture of error should be implemented in the classroom for the student to be able not only to locate errors but also, and above all, to learn from them. Yet the various proposals aimed at generating a culture of error in the classroom keep regarding error as all those responses and reactions (...) that are not considered as true or correct in each specific case, thereby not realizing that many of these alleged errors are really anomalies with very different characteristics and consequences despite their seeming resemblance. In this paper, I rely on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty to clarify the difference between errors and anomalies. Subsequently, I provide guidelines that may be adapted by each teacher to her students’ needs and development level in order to foster a culture of error that begins by distinguishing er... (shrink)

Wittgenstein scholars have tended to interpret the acquisition of certainties, and by extension, of a world-picture, as the achievement of a state in which these certainties are assimilated in a seemingly unconscious way as one masters language-games. However, it has not been stressed that the attainment of this state often involves facing a series of challenges or difficulties which must be overcome for the development of the world-picture and therefore the socialization process to be achieved. After showing, on the one (...) hand, how a world-picture is usually developed, and on the other hand, why a child who seemingly found itself trapped in a precocious skepticism might have serious problems in assimilating certainties, in this paper, I describe some of the challenges children often meet as they acquire a world-picture. Since the overcoming of these challenges is often needed for children to develop a world-picture, I aim at raising the awareness of the necessity of ‘learning to believe’, that is, of developing a series of skills that allow children to undertake the challenges described in this paper. (shrink)

Though Wittgenstein's On Certainty has been influential in analytic epistemology, its interpretation has been enormously controversial. It is true that exegesis has been mainly concerned with the proper characterization of Wittgenstein's very notion of ?certainty?; however, some important questions remain unanswered regarding this notion. On the one hand, I am above all referring to the study of the possibilities we have of retaining a certainty when it has seemingly been placed into question and, on the other hand, of regaining a (...) certainty once it has been lost. In this paper, I attempt to provide a detailed answer to both questions. In so doing, some important features of the picture of ourselves which emerges from Wittgenstein's On Certainty are also revealed. (shrink)

Algunos autores han intentado considerar los delirios como certezas –entendidas en el sentido de Wittgenstein– debido a las similitudes que parecen existir entre sus respectivos estatus epistemológicos. Sin embargo, dicho intento ha sido criticado con agudeza, entre otras razones, porque el contenido de los delirios choca frontalmente con el contenido de las certezas, por lo que los delirios no pueden ser comprendidos debido a los cambios en las relaciones de significado. Pero es evidente que, aunque los delirios no se puedan (...) contemplar como certezas, muchos delirios afectan de un modo u otro al sistema de certezas del paciente. Partiendo de esta base, no es descabellado pensar que dicha influencia pudiera ser también recíproca: en otras palabras, parece sumamente recomendable analizar si algunos delirios se podrían contemplar como el resultado de variaciones en certezas. En este artículo llevo a cabo dicho análisis al intentar mostrar que el origen de algunos delirios pedestres y severos puede ser hallado en lo que llamaré “ceguera a posibilidades” e “incertidumbre”, términos que he desarrollado teniendo en cuenta la obra del filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This paper presents the concept of ‘religious certainty’ I have developed by drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘certainty’. After describing the particular traits of religious certainty, this paper addresses two difficulties derived from this concept. On the one hand, it explains why religious certainty functions as such even though all its consequences are far from being absolutely clear; on the other hand, it clarifies why, unlike the rest of certainties, the loss of religious certainty does not result in the (...) collapse of the world-picture made up of all certainties. Subsequently, it analyzes to what extent the teacher can teach religious certainty by acting as a facilitator for its acquisition–if desired—particularly bearing in mind that religious certainty cannot be attained at will. These basic teaching guidelines have several advantages. First, they make it possible to know the nature of religious certainty even better. Second, and most importantly, the fact of having adopted the perspective of a teacher who tries inculcating a religious certainty contributes to detecting and preventing forms of indoctrination that, arguably, might go unnoticed even when attempting to properly present religious certainty—or rather, this way of being religious—in current schools to foster understanding thereof. (shrink)

In this paper, I describe the main lines of modern error theory, a systemic theory which regards errors not as the results of someone’s negligence, but as parts of a complex system. Bearing in mind that errors must be considered as such by an observer or attributor, I expose Wittgenstein’s conception of the attributor responsible for discerning if a strange event constitutes an error or an anomaly. Subsequently, I illustrate this conception of the attributor by describing some traits of the (...) role played by many attributors in business organizations, specifically in the production line of a car manufacturer’s plant, when carrying out the rootcause analysis of problems that arise in the plant. Finally, I reveal a paradox whereby if the attributor denies the possibility that anomalies may happen without being able to explain their source within the system that he or she takes as reference, then the very idea of system no longer makes sense. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s conception of ‘persuasion’, understood as the persuader’s attempt to modify the persuadee’s certainties, has been recently misinterpreted by some scholars. For Persichetti has overlooked the fact that one cannot persuade unintentionally, while Marconi and Perissinotto have not only taken for granted that persuasion consists in the mere transfer of a world-picture or set of certainties to an individual even when she has not alternative or different certainties, but also that education is restricted to persuading or transmitting certainties. After clarifying (...) these misinterpretations, among others, I argue that persuasion is not used for teaching certainties at the outset, but for modifying them when they do not fit the ones expected by the persuader. If it is agreed that education partly consists in transmitting a world-picture, then persuasion constitutes a necessary resource for educators. Lastly, I provide a set of guidelines for teachers to draw attention to the basic aspects of persuasion that they should consider in the classroom. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, Volume 45, Issue 1, Page 91-97, January 2022.

In this paper I outline the most relevant traits of the term ‘trust’ understood as one of the synonyms for ‘certainty’ that Ludwig Wittgenstein used in his posthumous work On Certainty. To this end, I analyze the paragraphs of On Certainty in which reference is made to pupils who are expected to trust what is taught by their teacher: in addition, I note that such a process is largely based on the attitude of rejection and bewilderment that teachers promote towards (...) people who call into doubt those certainties that pupils are expected to assimilate. Subsequently, after emphasizing the importance that Wittgenstein attached to the ineffability of certainties, I explain how such certainty or trust can be staged. Lastly, I clarify why an appropriate contemplation of this staging can be of great help for pupils to achieve at least four goals of educational interest: thus, children can not only strengthen their capacity for wonder, but also experience what things are ineffable, glimpse the limits of rationality, and become more tolerant of people who are partakers of a different world-picture. (shrink)

Victor Klemperer (1881-1960) foi um professor alemão de línguas românicas que ficou famoso especialmente pelos escritos em que ele relatou como os nazis deformaram a língua alemã ao ponto de desenvolver o que ele chamou de “a língua do Terceiro Reich”. Neste artigo, pretendo explicar o que esta língua revela sobre certezas, compreendidas no sentido de Wittgenstein, o que, por sua vez, também pode contribuir para fornecer uma visão mais abrangente da medida em que a língua do Terceiro Reich foi (...) cuidadosamente projetada para influenciar decisivamente a atitude e a visão de mundo dos alemães. Especificamente, abordarei oito questões: a perversão da moralidade através de uma mensagem radicalmente bipolarizada; a criação de um contexto no qual todos os julgamentos devem ser abandonados; o uso de dois tipos de persuasão; o enviesamento para a generalização excessiva das certezas; a dificuldade de avaliar casos-limite de certeza; o erro propagandístico de gritar alegadas certezas; a exclusão emocional da dúvida - prestando especial atenção aos domínios do exército e da religião, bem como ao uso de slogans e superlativos; e a substituição de imagens do mundo nazis. (shrink)

There is at present no publication specifically dedicated to analyzing the philosophical implications of augmented reality, especially regarding knowledge formation, which constitutes a fundamental trait of knowledge society. That is why this volume includes an analysis of the applications and implications of augmented reality. While applications cover diverse fields like psychopathology and education, implications concern issues as diverse as negative knowledge, group cognition, the internet of things, and ontological issues, among others. In this way, it is intended not only to (...) generate answers, but also, to draw attention to new problems that arise with the diffusion of augmented reality. In order to contemplate these problems from diverse perspectives, the auhors are from a variety of fields - philosophy, computer sciencess, education, psychology, and many more. Accordingly, the volume offers varied and interesting contributions which are of interest to professionals from multiple disciplines. (shrink)

After making reference to the socio-cultural context of fin-desiècle Vienna —in which Otto Weininiger’s work appears— I describe in this paper the main characteristics of the influence that Weininger’s Über die letzten Dinge had on Ludwig Wittgenstein. I deal specifically with the way Wittgenstein’s work reflects Weininger’s remarks on criminality, animality, and madness.

In this paper, I try to facilitate the understanding of the concept of ‘omniscience’ by taking into account the terminology developed in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Thus, I start by explaining why omniscience can be regarded neither as grounded knowledge nor as ungrounded or objective certainty. Instead, omniscience might be considered as subjective certainty, which has the advantage of leaving scope for a doubt that enables and strengthens religious faith. Lastly, I clarify how God’s omniscience would be enriched if He (...) were informed of—without needing to share—our objective certainties, in addition to which I highlight two paradoxes that would arise if we disagreed with God regarding some of our objective certainties. These paradoxes reveal that even though the believer could not understand literally God’s statement, it might strengthen her faith if she realized and accepted that a true and consistent commitment to such statement entails the suspension of her own capacity for judgment. (shrink)

En este artículo discrepo de Kusch (2016) en tres cuestiones relacionadas con las expresiones de certezas aritméticas –en el sentido de Wittgenstein– y los usos regulares de las expresiones aritméticas. Específicamente, explico por qué los cálculos no se convierten en certezas por el hecho de haber sido probados; Argumento que los cálculos probados constituyen enunciados de conocimiento; y, por último, pero no menos importante, concluyo de esto que tales cálculos probados son decibles, mientras que las certezas aritméticas son inefables o (...) indecibles. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty about the acquisition of child language have gone nearly unnoticed for the commentators of his work. In this paper, I analyze some of those remarks to shed light on the main questions posed in On the categorical distinction between knowledge and certainty; the nature of language-games; the refutation of skepticism and, above all, the challenges involved by learning to believe.

Según señaló Ludwig Wittgenstein en Sobre la certeza, podríamos imaginar acontecimientos tan extraños que ni siquiera tuvieran cabida en nuestros juegos de lenguaje. En este artículo analizaremos las distintas consecuencias de estos hechos, prestando especial atención a la posibilidad de decidir aferrarnos a nuestras propias certezas. Concretamente, detallaremos en qué circunstancias podemos tomar tal decisión.

In this paper I show that madness, in the context of Wittgenstein’s later work, should not be mistaken for the grammatical gap which is opened when a reaction takes place, which has no place in the language-game played in that very moment. Besides, and bearing in mind that we often do not place worth on something until we miss it, it is emphasized that it is in the madman, taken as a grammatically isolated individual, with whom, we are best able (...) to appreciate agreement in form of life on which Wittgenstein’s later work is based. (shrink)

Tras describir a grandes rasgos los sistemas de creencias propuestos por Quine y Wittgenstein, en este artículo hago referencia a las similitudes y diferencias que Pieranna Garavaso y Danièle Moyal Sharrock advierten entre ambos sistemas. Partiendo de la crítica de estas interpretaciones, llamaré la atención sobre un aspecto del sistema wittgensteiniano de creencias que, desde mi punto de vista, es de la mayor importancia. Concretamente, me refiero a la posibilidad de revisar incluso las creencias más básicas de este sistema. El (...) análisis de este problema me llevará a tratar otra cuestión no menos importante: ¿supondría la revisión de nuestras creencias más fundamentales que el concepto mismo de humanidad dejara de tener sentido? (shrink)

Many authors have tried to offer a definition of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical problems. In this paper my aim is to show that essentialist tendency is just the opposite of Wittgenstein’s attitude, an attitude based on paying attention to the clarification of misunderstandings concerning the use of words: the term ‘problem’ invites us to think on the corresponding ‘solution’, but far from offering solutions or explanations, Wittgenstein wanted to show a philosophical modus operandi comparable to the task of untying knots.

Lurie, Yuval: Wittgenstein on the Human Spirit. Rodopi, Amsterdam & New York, 2012, 277 pp.

Aunque Karl Jaspers afirmó en su Psicopatología general que la génesis de un delirio es incomprensible tanto empática como racionalmente, millones de espectadores de todo el mundo y multitud de críticos parecen haber comprendido de ambas maneras la génesis del caso de síndrome de Cotard que aparece al final de la película El sexto sentido (1999). Sin embargo, en el presente artículo mostraré que la posibilidad de comprender racional y empáticamente la génesis de este caso no es real, sino meramente (...) ilusoria. (shrink)

This volume treats the topic of rationality developing a perspective that integrates elements of philosophy of language, phenomenology, pragmatism, and philosophy of life. The two reference authors, Wittgenstein and Ortega, are contemporaries but come from different philosophical traditions. Wittgenstein's early work was influenced by logical positivism. Later he developed an influential approach to philosophy of language. Ortega was influenced by Neo-Kantianism, perspectivism, life philosophy, and phenomenology. On this basis, he developed an independent approach that has become known as ratiovitalism. Astonishing (...) affinities between their respective reflections on rationality motivated the experiment of bringing the different approaches into a synergetic relation. Both investigate the structures and limits of rationality, emphasize the importance of basic beliefs, and criticize the restriction of rationality concepts to the intellectual sphere. The contributions of the volume focus on: dynamics of belief and knowledge, implicit and explicit knowledge, the concept of “vital reason”, the role of world-pictures and forms of life, questions regarding certainty, ignorance, doubt, and madness, as well as matters of pluralism and relativism. (shrink)

Según Philippe Sers, Wassily Kandinsky y George Berkeley coincidieron al contemplar el mundo como un lenguaje que nos habla de lo espiritual que hay en el fondo del alma humana. Sin embargo, en el presente artículo me propongo mostrar que esta afirmación de Sers es confusa e incluso equívoca. Concretamente, mostraré que la visión del mundo como lenguaje tiene cabida en la concepción del lenguaje divino de Berkeley pero no en la noción que Kandinsky tenía del lenguaje cósmico, mientras que (...) la afirmación de que dicho lenguaje habla de lo espiritual que hay en el fondo del alma humana es atribuible en mucha mayor medida a Kandinsky —si bien el lenguaje cósmico no sería un “lenguaje” rigurosamente hablando— que a Berkeley. (shrink)

Según Danièle Moyal-Sharrock y Avrum Stroll, hay razones de peso para hablar de un “tercer Wittgenstein” cuyo corpus estaría formado por todas las obras que el filósofo vienés escribió con posterioridad a 1946, incluida la segunda parte de sus Investigaciones filosóficas. Entre las principales razones se encuentran el desarrollo de una nueva forma de fundamentalismo en la que el fundamento pertenece a una categoría distinta de lo fundamentado; la gramaticalización de la experiencia; la disolución del problema mente-cuerpo y la desmitificación (...) del escepticismo. En este artículo no sólo analizo dichos argumentos, sino que también parto de las principales diferencias entre los que se han venido llamando “primer” y “segundo Wittgenstein” para concluir que no tiene sentido hablar de un “tercer Wittgenstein”. (shrink)

RESUMENEl hombre moderno puede estar tentado a dar por supuesto que la diferencia entre razón y locura no fue creada en un momento dado; lejos de tal cosa, puede pensar que dicha diferencia constituye un hecho evidente, ya que será suficiente que contemple detenidamente a un loco para convencerse de que no tienen absolutamente nada en común. Sin embargo, este artículo no sólo explica en qué consiste el orden primitivo que el hombre moderno comparte con el loco, sino que además (...) ilustra las resistencias que el hombre moderno muestra al apreciar dicho orden.PALABRAS CLAVERazón, locura, orden, sociedad, voluntadABSTRACTThe modern man may be tempted to presuppose that the difference between reason and madness was not created in a certain moment; far from that, he may think that this difference constitutes an obvious fact as, just by looking carefully at a madman he may realize that they have absolutely nothing in common. However, this paper not only explains the nature of the primitive order the modern man shares with the madman, but also illustrates the resistance the modern man puts up when noticing this order.KEYWORDSReason, madness, order, society, will. (shrink)